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The Long and Winding Road: 
Case Comment on Mikisew Cree First 
Nation v. Canada (Minister of 
Canadian Heritage)1 
Bryan P. Schwartz and Darla L. Rettie* 
I. OVERVIEW 
In Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian 
Heritage), the Court addressed the tension in the numbered treaties 
between the right of First Nations to hunt and fish as before and the 
authority of governments to “take up” land for settlement and other 
purposes. The Court decided that the Crown must engage in a 
meaningful process of consultation and accommodation when a 
contemplated “taking up” may have an adverse effect on the exercise of 
a First Nation’s treaty rights. These duties apply regardless of whether 
the “taking up” is so substantial as to amount to a prima facie 
infringement of a treaty right.2  
This framework for consultation adopted by the Court was the one 
adopted in two recent cases involving the rights of First Nations that had 
not yet been proved: Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of 
Forests)3 and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia 
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(Project Assessment Director).4 The Supreme Court held in these cases 
that the Crown’s obligation to consult flows from the honour of the 
Crown. 
It remains to be explored in future cases whether the Haida 
framework is significantly different than that used for addressing cases 
of outright substantive infringement of rights — first outlined in R. v. 
Sparrow, and subsequently refined in R. v. Badger.5 Both the Haida and 
Sparrow frameworks are flexible. The scope of the Crown’s obligations 
to consult and accommodate, in both situations, will depend on such 
factors as the seriousness of the adverse effect on the exercise of rights 
(or claimed rights). The application of the Haida framework in a 
particular situation may be sufficient to establish that Crown action is 
unlawful, and thereby make the application of the Sparrow test moot.6 
The judgment of the Supreme Court in Mikisew v. Canada invites at 
least two questions:  
 
• Why did the Court choose to adopt a preliminary process analysis 
instead of directly applying the Sparrow infringement test, as it had 
done in Badger, where another treaty right (to hunt, fish and trap) 
was in tension with a Crown authority recognized in the treaty?  
• Why did the Court not define with some precision what level of 
interference with the exercise of a treaty right amounts to an 
infringement that triggers the application of the Sparrow test?  
II. BACKGROUND 
The case of Mikisew v. Canada is essentially about a proposed and 
approved 118-kilometre winter road, designed to track alongside the 
Mikisew Cree First Nation Peace Point Reserve. The journey to achieve 
recognition that it was entitled to direct consultation on the proposed 
road took the Mikisew Cree First Nation (“Mikisew”) six years, and 
three court proceedings.7 In the end, the Minister’s road approval order 
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was quashed on the basis that the Crown had failed to engage in a direct 
and meaningful consultation process, prior to authorizing construction.  
The Mikisew are signatories to Treaty No. 8, under which they 
surrendered 840,000 sq km of land to Crown, in exchange for reserve 
land, and the right to hunt, fish and trap on the surrendered land. Rights 
explicated in Treaty No. 8 are subject to a number of internal limitations 
— including the Crown’s right to “take up” land for settlement, trading, 
resources, or similar purposes: 
And Her Majesty the Queen hereby agrees with the said Indians that 
they shall have right to pursue their usual vocations of hunting, 
trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered as before 
described, subject to such regulations as may from time to time be 
made by the Government of the country, acting under the authority of 
Her Majesty, and saving and excepting such tracts as may be required 
or taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering, 
trading or other purposes. [Emphasis added.] (Report of 
Commissioners for Treaty No. 8 (1899), at p.12)8 
Initially, the Minister of Canadian Heritage approved a routing of 
the winter road that ran directly through Mikisew Cree First Nation 
Peace Point Reserve, which is wholly contained within Wood Buffalo 
National Park. The park itself is entirely within the area covered by 
Treaty No. 8.9 The decision was made absent any direct consultation 
with the Mikisew. Instead, the government held open houses, inviting 
public comment.  
After the Mikisew protested, the road alignment was changed to 
track around the reserve rather than through it, although it was still 
within the traditional territories of the Mikisew. Again, this decision was 
reached without direct consultation with the affected First Nation, nor 
did the evidence establish that any consideration was given to whether 
the new route would minimize impacts on the Mikisew’s treaty rights.10 
The Minister ultimately approved a 200-metre wide, 23 square 
kilometre road corridor in which use of firearms would be prohibited.11 
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Although the communities within the park itself are rather small, the 
residents in those communities participate in traditional hunting and 
trapping. The proposed route ran through registered trapping areas and 
moose hunting grounds. At trial, Hansen J. found that approximately 14 
Mikisew families who trap and 100 Mikisew hunters would be 
adversely affected by the road, which the Court found to be a significant 
number, within the context of remote northern communities of relatively 
few families.12  
At trial, Hansen J. applied the infringement test outlined in Sparrow, 
and found public notices were not sufficient as the Mikisew were 
entitled to direct consultation. The infringement was not justified, and 
the order was quashed. 
The majority of the Court of Appeal reversed on argument that 
Treaty No. 8 expressly contemplated the “taking up” of surrendered 
lands for various purposes — including roads — and that such a “taking 
up” was a proper exercise of the Crown’s right under the treaty rather 
than a treaty infringement.  
The majority judgment held that: 
…with the exceptions of cases where the Crown has taken up land in 
bad faith or has taken up so much land that no meaningful right to hunt 
remains, taking up land for a purpose express or necessarily implied in 
the treaty itself cannot be considered an infringement of the treaty 
right to hunt.13  
The test of “no meaningful right to hunt” was invented for the 
occasion by the majority in the Court of Appeal. On this basis, the 
majority of the Court of Appeal found no obligation to consult, and the 
Sparrow test was not considered. It should be noted that the decision 
was delivered before the release of the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Haida and Taku. 
The Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge that the proposed 
corridor would affect the Mikisew’s ability to exercise their right to hunt 
and trap. The Crown’s suggestion that the test should be whether the 
Mikisew were able to practically exercise their right within the province 
“as a whole” was rejected as untenable, as was the Attorney General’s 
suggestion that the infringement of 23 sq km was de minimus.14  
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The Court held the Crown had not discharged its procedural duty to 
engage directly with the applicant in consultation, or to minimize the 
adverse impacts of the winter road on its hunting, fishing, and trapping 
rights. On this basis, the case was sent back to the Crown for further 
consultation and consideration. 
III. REALIGNMENT OF COURT ANALYSIS IN TREATY MATTERS 
1. Starting Point in Analysis — Have Process Rights Been 
Observed? 
Although Treaty No. 8 clearly contemplates a number of limitations on 
the right to hunt/fish/trap — i.e., when lands are “taken up” — the 
historical context of Treaty No. 8, and the tensions underlying treaty 
interpretation, require the Crown to engage in a process when it seeks to 
“take up” land that is currently available for treaty guaranteed purposes. 
A transfer process without consultation, the Court concludes, would not 
adequately respect the treaty rights of First Nations to hunt, fish and 
trap.15 On this basis, the Court held the Mikisew had a right to 
consultation and accommodation at a preliminary stage of project 
consideration, the content of which turned on the degree to which their 
treaty rights would be affected by the proposed road.  
In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejects the position of the 
majority of the Court of Appeal: that a treaty right to “take up” land is a 
right to take unilateral action, save for the instances where it can be 
shown that no meaningful amount of land remains or that the Crown has 
acted in bad faith.16 The Court found this position untenable, as it would 
ignore situations where such action would significantly and adversely 
affect Aboriginal interests.  
With its decision in Mikisew v. Canada, the Court built on similar 
holdings in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,17 Sparrow, Badger, Haida 
and Taku, when it stated that the Crown’s procedural duty to consult is 
grounded in the honour of the Crown — which is a distinct source of 
obligation that exists independent of the text of any specific treaty. As 
such, the honour of the Crown may be invoked as a central principle in 
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resolving Aboriginal claims to consultation.18 In the instant case, the 
Court stated:  
[T]he honour of the Crown infuses every treaty and the performance 
of every treaty obligation. Treaty 8 therefore gives rise to Mikisew 
procedural rights (e.g. consultation) as well as substantive rights (e.g. 
hunting, fishing and trapping rights). Were the Crown to have 
barrelled ahead with implementation of the winter road without 
adequate consultation, it would have been in violation of its 
procedural obligations, quite apart from whether or not the Mikisew 
could have established that the winter road breached the Crown’s 
substantive treaty obligations as well.  
The threshold test for triggering a procedural duty to consult is low; 
the Court will imply some consultation obligations when Crown 
conduct “might adversely affect” a treaty right.19 What is variable is the 
content of the Crown’s duty to engage in a consultation/accommodation 
process. Once engaged, the scope of required consultation, within the 
treaty context, is predicated on a number of factors including: 
 
• the clarity of promises made under the treaty; 
• the seriousness of impact of proposed Crown actions; 
• the history of dealings between the Crown and the particular First 
Nation; and 
• whether the treaty provides a framework to manage foreseen 
changes in land use.20 
Based on the strength of the listed factors, the Crown’s obligations 
will fall somewhere within the consultation spectrum, first outlined in 
Delgamuukw. In the instant case, the Crown’s procedural duty to consult 
was found to be at the lower end of the spectrum.  
In Mikisew v. Canada, the Court makes explicit reference to what 
adequate low level consultation would involve: giving notice, offering 
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direct engagement, providing information addressing relevant concerns 
and potential adverse effects, soliciting feedback, and attempting to 
minimize adverse impacts.21  
Although the Court takes pains to state that the consultation process 
would not have given the Mikisew a veto over the road alignment, the 
content of the right is expressly more substantial than low-end 
consultation rights identified in Haida, which merely required the 
Crown to give notice, disclose information, and discuss issues raised in 
response to the notice,22 or in Delgamuukw, where at the low end of the 
spectrum, the Court identified that the duty to consult may be no more 
than the obligation to discuss important decisions that will be taken, 
with respect to lands held under Aboriginal title.23  
The more exacting the obligations, the less flexibility the 
government may ultimately have when designing consultation policies 
or regulatory mechanisms that will meet the minimums stated within 
relevant decided cases.  
2. Possible Reasons for the Analytical Shift 
The recognition of a duty to consult in the context of “taking up” cases, 
in Mikisew v. Canada, adds to the scope of obligations to consult and 
accommodate flowing from the “honour of the Crown”. The Sparrow 
framework applies to actual infringements of Aboriginal and treaty 
rights, rights under the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements, and to 
the regulation of hunting and fishing rights under the numbered treaties. 
The Haida framework applies to claimed but as yet unproved rights and 
to contemplated “takings up” of land under the numbered treaties. The 
Court’s recognition of the last-mentioned duty clearly flowed in part 
from its view that a failure to do so in cases like Mikisew v. Canada 
would amount to a high-handedness in dealing with constitutionally 
protected rights. 
The question that naturally arises, however, is why the Court chose 
to invoke the Haida rather than the Sparrow framework in the context of 
“takings up”, in contrast to its earlier approach to another treaty pairing 
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(rights to hunt and fish, subject to the Crown’s right to regulate) in 
Badger.24  
We speculate that the Court may have chosen to engage in a Haida 
framework analysis for a number of reasons: 
1.  The Sparrow framework explicitly says compensation may be a 
factor in some cases. 
2.  The Court may have tried to steer clear of any need to consider 
compensation on the basis of its belief that this matter is best dealt 
with initially as part of the negotiation process between parties. At 
the trial level, Hansen J. chose not to consider the adequacy of the 
ex gratia payments that had been offered by the Crown, in light of 
her finding on the inadequacy of the consultation.25 
3.  There may have been some reluctance to deal with compensation, as 
the Court might have been concerned about whether this might 
amount to the Crown paying for the same thing (the right to take up 
land for settlement) twice — initially, when the treaty was signed, 
and then later on in the context of an actual development.  
 In reality, two stages of compensation — one at the time of the 
treaty, another in the context of an actual taking up of land — might 
actually be entirely appropriate in some cases. The treaty right 
might be viewed as generally authorizing the Crown to share the 
land, with additional compensation acquired only if and when 
Crown use of the land has a significant adverse effect. While 
wrestling with the issue of compensation may have been one reason 
for the Court to steer clear of the Sparrow test, it is not by any 
means clear that the same issue will not arise in the context of the 
Haida framework. In some cases, a First Nation might successfully 
argue that compensation — which might be in the form of revenue 
sharing from a development — is part of the necessary 
accommodation. 
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4.  The Court may be adopting a more cautious approach to the 
recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights in the aftermath of the 
political backlash against its decision in R. v. Marshall.26 The Court 
may have been concerned about the consequences of finding, as the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal held in Halfway River First 
Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests),27 that every 
“taking up of land for settlement” should be viewed as tantamount 
to an infringement of a treaty right. It may have been concerned that 
such an approach would lead in some subsequent cases to judicial 
decisions that would unduly (from the perspective of the Court) 
impair the ability of provincial governments to manage and develop 
Crown lands.  
5.  The negotiating record of Treaty No. 8 includes statements by the 
Crown that could be construed as promising that the taking up of 
land would not have a significant impact on the exercise of treaty 
rights. At the time of the treaty, even the Crown did not expect a 
large influx of settlers into the Treaty No. 8 area.  The judgment of 
the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledges the point, but focuses 
on the written text of the treaty to conclude that “change” was 
indeed contemplated.28 By resting the judgment on the issue of 
consultation at the preliminary and planning stage, and avoiding the 
question of when a substantive infringement of the treaty right to 
hunt occurs, the Court was able to avoid delving deeply into an 
arguable large tension between the oral and written versions of the 
treaty.  
IV. WHEN DOES THE “TAKING UP” OF LAND INTERFERE SO 
SIGNIFICANTLY WITH TREATY RIGHTS TO HUNT, FISH AND TRAP 
THAT THE SPARROW TEST FOR INFRINGEMENTS IS APPLICABLE? 
The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether the proposed 
“taking up” of lands was subject to the Sparrow infringement test. Both 
sides argued that their interpretation of the Court’s decision in Badger 
ought to be determinative.  
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In considering when exactly a “taking up” would amount to a treaty 
infringement, requiring strict justification under the Sparrow test, the 
Court starts by identifying a basic principle: not every “taking up” under 
Treaty No. 8 will amount to a treaty infringement.  
In furtherance of this statement, the Court rejects the holding in 
Halfway River that any interference with the right to hunt is a prima 
facie infringement which must be justified under the Sparrow test.29  
This statement should not be over-read as meaning that a Sparrow 
analysis is not applicable in “taking up” cases. The Court suggests quite 
the contrary, in the Mikisew v. Canada decision. The Court states that in 
cases involving a proposed “taking up” it will first consider the process 
by which the “taking up” is planned, before it moves to a Sparrow 
analysis.30  
After Mikisew v. Canada, a contemplated government action may 
be quashed based on either of two grounds: based on a procedural 
ground — whether or not the facts would have supported a finding of 
infringement of hunting, fishing or trapping rights — or on a substantive 
ground, through a Sparrow analysis of the proposed infringement.  
What the Court does not do is create a clear picture of when a 
Crown measure is sufficiently disruptive as to constitute a substantive 
infringement requiring Sparrow justification. It gives some guidance, 
when it concludes if a particular Treaty No. 8 First Nation is left with no 
“meaningful right to hunt” over its traditional territories, that First 
Nation would clearly have a potential action for treaty infringement.31 
But what about instances between “adverse impact” (Sparrow threshold 
requirement to prove prima facie infringement)32 and “no meaningful 
right left”? The Court was equally unclear on whether, in the instant 
case, an application of the Sparrow test would have been appropriate if 
the Crown had attempted to justify its consultation in Sparrow terms.33  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Mikisew v. Canada leaves some unanswered questions that might have 
to be addressed in later cases. The Court will have to further refine the 
applicability of Sparrow, in cases where there has been a “taking up” 
and in other rights contexts. As the duty to accommodate is only 
referenced in passing (Crown must attempt to minimize adverse 
impacts) there is no clear indication of what level of accommodation 
would be necessary based on the facts in the instant case. 
In practice, the decision of the Court may encourage federal and 
provincial governments to reach more negotiated agreements with First 
Nations on contemplated development. By doing so, federal and 
provincial governments will avoid the legal risk associated with 
proceeding in circumstances where an affected First Nation does not 
believe it has been adequately consulted or accommodated. Such 
agreements may involve elements such as co-management of 
environmental issues and sharing in the revenues produced by economic 
development. As in many other cases involving First Nations, the Court 
was not so much interested in imposing specific outcomes, either in the 
case actually up for adjudication or in future cases, as in establishing a 
framework for reconciliation of competing rights and interests through 
dialogue and mutual accommodation.  
  
